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## THE TABLET.——No. XXIII.

*"A course of rigorous self-denial in youth may prove inimical to the happiness of old age."*

IN an excellent discourse which I heard a few sundays ago, the preacher exhibited, in a striking point of light, the propensity of mankind to sacrifice their prospects of future happiness to the love of present gratification. As I seldom wish to call in question the propriety of religious admonitions; and as, on this occasion, the illustrations were peculiarly pointed and forcible, I might have proceeded to the end of life, under the full conviction that such sentiments were just and reasonable, had not some doubts been excited by the following letter, I lately received from a friend. The reader must be informed, that this acquaintance of mine retired a few years ago into the country, with a view of softening the asperities of life by relaxation and indulgence. He had long been engaged in business, with much care and assiduity, that he might put himself in circumstances to enjoy leisure and amusement. But it happened that his ardour to acquire property had produced such habits of diligence and activity, that he is utterly at a loss, how to occupy his mind, in the tranquil scenes of so calm a retreat. Removed from the anxiety and exercise of vigorous pursuits, he cannot change his feelings with his situation. In the early periods of life, he had solaced himself with the expectations of finding exquisite delight, in devoting his declining years to retirement, which might be alternately employed in contemplation or diversions. But unfortunately he did not consult the principles of human nature. No man can suddenly relinquish a course of *old* habits, without subjecting himself to a tedious interval, before he can form *new* ones. By destroying his accustomed sources of happiness, bad as they may be, he cannot readily adopt others that are not worse. The letter, to which I allude, thus describes the situation of my correspondent.

"*L*——, *May* 10, 1789.

"DEAR SIR,

"Your congratulations are *pleasing*, as they demonstrate your good will and friendship; but they are *painful*, in convincing me that you can wish my happiness more easily than I can realize it. If any felicity can be derived from being happy in your imagination, while in my own I am miserable, you congratulate me with propriety.

"You will ask, and with great reason, why I am not happy; and you will even wonder to hear me complain, when at the same time, I assure you that I have not a wish ungratified. Still however I am as unhappy a being as exists. It is not disappointed ambition; it is not an unsatisfied temper of avarice; it is not perverse or disgraceful conduct in my family; it is not pain or infirmity of body; it is not a reluctance to leave this world, or the dread of appearing in another, that disturbs my tranquility. No! None of these causes operate in my disquietude. My infelicity only results from disappointed hopes. I have formed expectations of happiness which I shall never realize. My anticipations were vain and fallacious, because they amused me with prospects that ware contrary to the natural disposition of things. The mind that has accustomed itself to reject present gratification, for the sake of enjoying that which is future, loses by this means the relish for any enjoyment at all. I am in possession of every ingredient to gratify my wishes, that I ever hoped or anticipated. They are far however from producing the effect I intended.

"In short, my past habits are at variance with my present plans and prospects. We are so much the slaves of custom, that whatever mode of life we have long pursued, cannot be suddenly altered, without striking a dangerous blow upon our happiness. In vain had I flattered myself, that this elegant retreat would be a delightful substitute for the bustle and watchfulness of an anxious employment. The disagreeable incidents of my former occupations, have all escaped my memory; while the pleasing circumstances are heightened by the contrast of my present situation. I would not regard what noise or tumult I could hear, if it would serve to wear away my tedious, vacant hours, in this insipid place of solitude. Every charm, I had figured to myself from this retirement, has fled from my imagination. When I awake in the morning, I cannot form schemes to amuse me half through the day; and before night, I am tempted to believe that nature has changed her laws, and that the planets do not move with their wonted celerity. Thus, my friend, have my hopes been defeated; as those of every other person must be, who expects that liberal enjoyments can afford contentment, after a long and rigid exercise of business and parsimony. The *moral* world will no sooner change its laws than the *natural*."

[This letter to be concluded in our next number.]

## *SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.*

*In the* House *of* REPRESENTATIVES *of the* UNITED STATES

[FRIDAY, JUNE 19.

Continuation of the debate on the question, *Whether the Secretary of the department of foreign affairs, shall be removable by the President?*

Mr. JACKSON: I am well aware Sir, how irksome it must be to have another member rise upon this question; but when I consider that the liberties of this country may be suspended upon the decision, I feel it my duty to trespass once more on the patience of the committee: I shall make but a few remarks.—Mr. Jackson then adverted to the arguments which had been so strenuously urged to prove the division, and distinction of the powers of the several branches, and added, I deny Sir, that there ever was a government in which the powers were not blended in a greater or less degree.—Shall we find it in *Rome*, *Carthage*, or in any of the ancient governments? Let us turn our eyes to Britain, or the other powers of Europe—there we find that the will of the executive gives law to the legislature—Let us look into our constitution, there we see the executive has a qualified legislative power—his signature is required to complete the acts of government—he may adjourn the House from time to time—Will gentlemen still contend that the executive power is distinct? Will they explain away these truths? I call upon gentlemen to shew the necessity of delegating this power; it cannot be maintained upon any principle, but that of rendering the President completely independent of all controul by the legislature. Gentlemen have come forward with their spectres.—The western territory was one, and molasses was another of those frightful images; but now there is nothing to alarm our apprehensions—all is perfectly safe—I wish that gentlemen were more consistent with themselves—Let us again revert to ancient history—Carthage lost her liberties by taking power from one branch to confer it upon another, and the accumulation of power in one particular branch has swallowed up the liberties of most of the ancient republics.—It has never yet been proved, that the power which appoints, is not the power to remove.—I think the constitution has settled this question.

The President has already the sword; there will be a time when America will have an army—I do not confine my remarks to the present period—Let us look forward, when a different character from that which now presides, may be in the chair—The purse strings will be in his hands, and these with an army at his command, will enable him to lay prostrate the liberties of America—this is no spectre; experience of past ages confirms the observation, that a wise people, will never let their liberties lye at the meer will and pleasure of any man. Some gentlemen say there is no danger, as the President is chosen from the mass of the people—others deny this—how shall we reconcile these opposing opinions?

I call upon gentlemen to shew that there is no check upon the President provided in the constitution.

The celebrated Mr. Wilson, is of opinion, that the Senate is designed as this check. This sentiment is confirmed by other writers of reputation: Sir, I shall add nothing further, but my assent to the motion for striking out the clause.

Mr. BALDWIN: I have felt, Sir, an unusual anxiety during the debate upon this question, as I consider a proper decision upon it, of almost infinite consequence to the government.

The main objection to the clause is, that we shall violate the Constitution, by giving this power to the President—we have been reminded of our oaths, and with great solemnity warned against this violation; but in my opinion, gentlemen should alter their mode of expression, and say, that their *constructions* of the Constitution will be violated.

The principle ground of opposition to the Constitution, as I am authorised from the best information to say, was the association of the President with the Senate: Shall we not do away this objection, by drawing a line of separation as far as lies in our power?

It has repeatedly been said, that the power that *appoints* should be the only power to *remove*; but I deny the consequence; it does not follow; the judges only are to be removed by the Senate; the power of removal does not, and ought not to exist in the power that appoints.

This principle is not pursued by the Senate itself in the Judiciary Bill; there the power that appoints the inferior officers of the Federal Courts has not the power of displacing those officers.

If this had been the sense of the Convention who framed the Constitution, the clause, "to be removed in like manner," would have been added.

The maxim among the wisest legislators is, that the respective branches should not be blended any further, than is necessary to carry their *separate* powers into more complete operation.

If experience should point out the necessity of uniting these powers, it may be done; but what is the consequence apprehended from the exercise of this power? Why, gentlemen are afraid that the President may turn out a worthy man! It is his life, says the gentleman from New-Hampshire.

But the President cannot keep in an unworthy officer; he may be impeached by this House: This is an effectual check.

If the Constitution had provided for every contingency, instead of being contained in a sheet of paper, it would have swelled to a folio volume.

But the President may turn out so many, that the Senate will find it difficult to procure officers.

It should be remembered, that if a misunderstanding should arise between the President, and the head of a department, it is necessary that he should be removed; but every thing we hold dear is to be prostrated by the power of the President!

He is however to be elected every four years, and the jealousy of this people is ever alive to catch at every defect, and we always have the power of impeachment in our hands; but as it is a doubtful clause, as observed by the gentleman from Connecticut, we ought not to meddle with it: This is a bad sentiment in its operation: The great division of the Committee proves it is a doubtful question! We then are the disinterested branch: The President and Senate are the parties: It rests with us to decide: The Senate will receive with pleasure our decision on this question: We are fellow laborers: We are all trying to raise a noble structure upon the same foundation. I do not wish we should leave this question. I wish this Bill may go up with our full determination—the Senate will receive it with candour. The Judiciary is the constitutional judge of our laws, and they will decide upon this, and I think they will consider themselves obliged by our decision. It would be a criminal pusillanimity to retreat from this decision.

Mr. SYLVESTER: In yesterday's debate, Sir, we had the sublime, the marvellous and the pathetic—monsters with heads, and monsters without heads. It has been said, that we have no right to give a construction of the constitution; if to decide this question is contrary to the constitution, and can be made to appear so, I shall be against it; but if it is doubtful, it is our duty to give an opinion: If there is nothing contrary to the constitution, the question is, how we shall decide?

By virtue of the constitution, the executive power is vested in the President—the constitution is explicit as to appointments, and by that the power of the President is eclipsed—We have a right to create such officers by the constitution—If we have this right, we certainly have a right to modify the laws for their removal; and have a right consequently to delegate that power; and where can it be deposited with greater security? But it is said that the Senate must concur in the removal—this is matter of opinion as to the expediency of the power residing in the President; it is to be considered, that this is an high officer; it may be necessary for an immediate discharge, but in order to an impeachment, the vote of this House must be obtained; this would require time, and if officers are not to be removed but my impeachment, they have an inheritance in their office.

The present is the time for us to decide this important question; we are free and unbiassed; any errors may be rectified by the judges; that the President should have the power to appoint, and not to displace, would in my opinion, defeat his power to carry the constitution, so far as lays with him, into operation.

Mr. STONE: I consider, Sir, that the decision of this question will give a leading feature to the administration of the government.

The people, Sir, have adopted this constitution because they thought that it would more effectually secure their liberties—all the amendments which have been proposed, go to a more perfect establishment of their rights.

Our object should be to carry the constitution into execution upon its true principles, without considering whether there is too much power here, or too little there. It is not an indifferent thing (as has been asserted) that because there is a certain *quantum* of power to be exercised, how that power is appropriated. I cannot think that the associated powers of the President and the Senate, is so monstrous as some gentlemen have supposed; the association constantly takes place: In cases of treaty, this association is requisite—what injury is apprehended? If there is that danger predicted by gentlemen, we are in a hazardous situation?

The constitution has designated a balance, the President is to appoint; the Senate to approve; it remains to carry this balance throughout. This proposed delegation of power destroys the balance, for the President may defeat by removals these joint appointments.

As I respect the constitution, I would distribute the powers as nearly as possible as the constitution has done.

The separation of the powers maintained by some, is not a principle in the constitution—it is contended by writers on government, that the powers in general should be separated, and properly; but in the present case, there is an exception, and we ought to follow that exception, step by step.

Go through the constitution, and you do not find, that the President has a single power to appoint—The convention may have done wrong; but they did not think it safe to trust even the appointment of inferior officers but by law—It is said that the power of removal is in the President, and we cannot take it from him—this must be by implication; I never was fond of implications. Here Mr. Stone dilated upon the absurdity and danger of implications, and then proceeded: In all the departments, there are officers to be appointed, there is the army, the navy, the mint; who is to have the power of making all these appointments? It is said, that the President is the executive, and may discharge all these officers by himself, what follows? In absolute governments there is no doubt about implications; they always suppose that the monarch is unrestrained. The executive contended for must be defined, and then there will be no difficulty about implications. I think there are good reasons to be given why the Senate should have a voice in appointments and removals—in some views the Senate are responsible than the President—the Senate are the watchful guardians of the constitution—the electors of the President cannot be this guard, they are [illegible] through the States.

How far above the level of the people do they exalt the President, who think it derogatory to his dignity, to institute an enquiry into the conduct of an officer below him. We seem to forget the confidence we ought to have in the constitution—Do you place more confidence in the President than in the heads of departments, and the Senate together?

We have expended our time, blood and treasure to very little purpose, if we do not think that liberty and safety constitute the real dignity of human nature. I think there is more real dignity of soul in a common peasant of America, than in a prime minister of Europe. Mr. Stone added several other observations, and concluded with approbating the motion for striking out the clause.

Mr. VINING: I join with every gentleman in the idea of the very great importance of this subject, as it respects the constitution and the future operations of the government.

It has been sufficiently demonstrated by gentlemen, that the executive and legislative powers should be separated: But it has been asked, where does the government exist, whose powers are not blended? To answer this question fully would lead us into too extensive a field—but granting that in most countries this division of power is but faintly defined, yet in Great-Britain, where the science has been carried to the greatest perfection, hitherto known, and where the idea of *checks* is a leading feature in the system, there the powers are no farther blended than is necessary.

I am pleased with the great concern which gentlemen discover for liberty—upon the same principle I contend for the necessity of the clause. What has been the consequence of encroachments upon the executive in other countries? Anarchy, confusion, and the loss of that liberty which is now said to be at stake. The shortness of the time for which the President is elected is a sufficient preventative from abuse of power; but will you in order to prevent him from doing *harm*, deprive him of the power to do *good*? No instances can be adduced from history to prove the infringements of the executive—but on the contrary the weakening of the executive by taking away such powers as are requisite, has constantly been followed by anarchy and despotism.

It has been said, that it is cruel, to take away an office without an impeachment, a trial, &c. but the delays of impeachments will render removals almost impracticable: Besides let us reflect upon the train of disagreeable, and perhaps fatal consequences to the government, which may arise from an adherence to this mode. Suppose there should be parties in the Senate; and they will exist: How easy will it be to support an unworthy officer in his place, through the agency of such a party in the Senate; where decisions will be made by ballot, and where every man's vote will be a secret: What cabals and undue influence will be the consequence! In what a situation will this place our chief magistrate? Will this be agreeable to the spirit of the constitution? I think not. Let us remember that this government, like HERCULES, rose brawling from the cradle—let us avail ourselves of the practice, the wisdom and experience of former ages, and of other countries, and bring it to maturity.

The Senators—the representatives of the sovereignties of the States, are not chosen by men specially appointed for that purpose; but the President is chosen by electors who are chosen *immediately* by the people for that express design—hence the Senate is an improper body to interfere with the executive.

The powers of the Legislature ought to be commensurate to the objects of legislation: It is conceded that this act is a proper legislative act; but except it can be carried into compleat operation upon the principles of the constitution, it is a nullity.]

[The Debate upon this subject was extended to a greater length than any which preceded it—some observations were added to those which we have given, by several other gentlemen, when the question was determined, as mentioned in sketches of the proceedings of 19th inst. in No. 20, of our paper.]

[THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1789.

*Debate upon the Bill for eſtabliſhing the* TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

Mr. PAGE moved that theſe words "*Who ſhall digeſt and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the ſupport of public credit*" ſhould be ſtruck out of the ſecond clauſe of the bill: He added ſome obſervations to ſhew the impropriety of any man's being impowered to digeſt plans of revenue or any other for the Houſe: it was true, he ſaid, that ſome ſuch officer as this did originate ſuch plans and digeſts in other countries, but then it muſt be remembered, that in England particularly, the miniſter was always a member of that Houſe, where money bills originated; and that from thence he derived the right to interfere with, and bring forward his propoſitions upon the ſubject of revenue; but he hoped this Houſe would never permit the head of any department to carve out work for them, and introduce an undue influence in the repreſentative body.

Mr. BENSON obſerved, that except this clauſe is retained in the bill, we ſhall have no plans at all; the perſon who is to fill this office, whoever he may be, has no power by the clauſe, to carry any thing into effect, he can only propoſe. The concurrence of the Houſe, the Senate and the Preſident, are neceſſary to give efficacy to his plans: Should this clauſe be ſtruck out, it effectually defeats the whole deſign of the bill.

Mr. GOODHUE: This motion, Sir, I think is carrying jealouſy to a very extraordinary length indeed; that we ſhould be afraid to receive information from any perſon who is not a member of this Houſe: this is as much as to ſay, that we will not receive any light from without theſe doors upon the ſubject of finance: The Secretary of the treaſury, is the only perſon from whom we can receive that information in all its extent, which this Houſe will ſo peculiarly want.

Mr. PAGE replied, It is the duty of the members of this Houſe, to inform themſelves upon this, and every other ſubject; a committee of finance may be appointed, who can report the neceſſary plans, and then the buſineſs will originate where it ought.

I would aſk, whether it it not evident, that an officer of this deſcription, will have an undue influence and bias upon the minds of the members, by having the power to introduce meaſures into the Houſe? Let the Secretary form his plans, and let them be introduced by a member; but I never will agree that an officer, who is not a member, ſhall be admitted into this Houſe with his propoſitions, to advocate, urge and enforce them upon us: It will be found at laſt, that the Houſe has but the name of legiſlation, and the power of originating money bills will be transferred to the Secretary, and like the parliaments of France, we ſhall be called together to exerciſe only the power of regiſtering edicts; this may be called jealouſy, but I conceive it is the true language of the conſtitution. I wiſh for an energetic government; but I wiſh for a permanent one; and I will never conſent to meaſures in the infancy of the government, which will weaken that efficiency by alarming my conſtituents, by giving up any conſtitutional powers.

Mr. AMES: The gentleman laſt ſpeaking, appears to be apprehenſive of an infraction of the forms of the Houſe: This deſerves conſideration; but this is not the queſtion immediately before us. I conceive there are two principles which preſent themſelves to guide the committee: The one, that the powers of this officer be uſeful and efficient; and the other, that they ſhould be ſafe. The firſt enquiry then is, Whether this power will tend to general utility. If the Secretary is to be preſumed to have the beſt knowledge of the finances of the country; and if this Houſe is deſirous of acting upon the beſt information, it ſeems to follow logically, that he is to be conſulted; and the beſt mode will be, to derive the information from him perſonally. It will not be denied, that it will come within his province to have more accurate ideas upon this ſubject, than others who have no particular concern in it.

From the nature of his employment, he muſt be ſuppoſed to have a full and comprehenſive knowledge of the ſtate of the funds of the United States—the demands that will be made upon them, and the beſt mode of conducting them: He will be charged to acquire this knowledge [illegible] duty.

The ſubjects of finance are of ſuch a nature, that they never can have juſtice done them by public aſſemblies: This is a misfortune, which appears indefeaſibly attached to their very formation. The intereſts of finance are ſo intricate, ſo complicated, and ſo difficult to arrange, and the opinions of members ſo various and oppoſite, that one man may gain more knowledge by one hour's reſearch, than a popular aſſembly by an inveſtigation for years.

The knowledge of a financier will be very deſirable: Our finances, compared with thoſe of all other countries, are in a chaotic ſtate: I wiſh to let in a little ſunſhine upon them; and I cannot but flatter myſelf, that ſuch an office will be eſtabliſhed, as will put them in ſuch a ſituation, as that we ſhall not be aſhamed of them.

With reſpect to the danger apprehended, I cannot conceive from whence it is to ariſe: It is ſaid, that his opinion will have an undue influence; but can he make that to be true, which is not true? Can he report untruths, which the Houſe cannot detect? Truth may come in opportunely; it may deſtroy a favorite hypotheſis—this truth we may want: What means of public influence can he poſſeſs over the members? I can conceive of none; and it is impoſſible that in a public communication, he can have ſo improper an influence, as he may derive from out door intrigue, and private converſation: It is therefore more ſafe to receive his communications publicly, than to give them to individual members: It will eſtabliſh a legiſlative controul over this officer, to call upon him to bring the details of his duty upon the floor of the Houſe: It is a moſt effectual way of making him reſponſible; and will operate as a powerful check; and this is the reaſon, why the prime miniſter of Britain is obliged to appear on the floor of the Houſe of Commons. In addition to this, the people are hereby made acquainted with the ſtate of their money concerns.

Mr. Ames concluded, by ſaying, that he hoped that gentlemen would review their reaſons for ſtriking out the words, and not let an unreaſonable jealouſy defeat the moſt ſalutary regulations.

Mr. LIVERMORE: Mr. Chairman, I am for ſtriking out the words in the clauſe: I ſuppoſe that no perſon has a right to make propoſitions to the repreſentative body, who is not a member of this Houſe: This would introduce a dangerous influence; this will make the members careleſs and indifferent about an attention to this neceſſary and important part of their duty: The power to originate money bills is a ſacred depoſit, that ought not to be alienated or violated: Giving the Secretary this right will make him the ſource from whence all ſyſtems of Finance and plans of Revenue will proceed. The Congreſs, I remember, under the old Confederation, had an Ordinance ſimilar to this bill, and it was *then* proper, as they had the power of removal; but we ſhall not have this power, according to what has paſſed, and therefore I give my aſſent to the motion for ſtriking out thoſe words.

Mr. SEDGWICK: Sir, it does appear to me, that if we intend to realize the object of this bill, theſe words muſt not be ſtruck out: A conſideration of the different plans of revenue in the ſeveral States, renders it highly neceſſary to have an officer of this kind: The methods that will be uſed to defeat the Revenue, renders it neceſſary that there ſhould be an officer veſted with ſufficient powers to guard it: I cannot but think that the jealouſy which anticipates an undue influence, is not well founded: The independence of this Houſe will always be ſuperior to an undue controul of the Executive: If the plans which may be propoſed, were always of neceſſity to be adopted, there would be ſome weight in the objection; but when the plans are introduced into this Houſe, our various ideas will cauſe much time to be expended, before a current will be formed, in which the general opinion will ſet. I do think it next to an impoſſibility, that a popular aſſembly, compoſed of ſo many different members from different States, can be competent to form a good ſyſtem of Revenue. It is a ſubject which requires the cloſeſt application, the longeſt ſtudy, and the moſt comprehenſive view of things, to render a perſon properly adequate to it. We ſhall always find amazing delay in waiting to collect the opinion of individuals, upon ſo various a ſubject. I hope, therefore, the words will compoſe part of the bill.

Mr. BOUDINOT: Jealouſy, Sir, is valuable under a proper direction; but there is danger of carrying it too far: Let us conſider whether to realize the object before us, the power of the Secretary ought not to extend thus far: We are referred to individuals for information—this is, I conceive, giving up the point. One of the grand principles of the Conſtitution is the reſponſibility of officers: now if ſecret intelligence is obtained from *this* officer, and introduced here, it will deſtroy that reſponſibility, and will be pernicious and dangerous to the liberties of the United States: We have ſeen the incompetency of plans upon theſe principles in the individual States. This ſecret information opens the doors to the greateſt impoſitions and abuſes. It is therefore neceſſary that we ſhould have an officer, on whom we may officially call for this information.

It has been ſaid, that the Committee of the whole is the proper ſource of enquiry: This, Sir, I can by no means accede to. The Members when they come together, are under the controul of local prejudices, and muſt be naturally ignorant of many things neceſſary to be known, in order to form a wiſe deciſion. Enormous expence is continually accruing while this knowledge is acquiring. It will require ſome perſon to be continually employed in this buſineſs; his time, his attention, and talents, muſt all be devoted: The ſubject will be a ſcience, and his knowledge will be abſolutely neceſſary: I hope, Sir, the amendment will not take place.

Mr. HARTLEY was in favor of the motion for ſtriking out the words: The doctrine of the gentleman laſt ſpeaking, proved too much: That one perſon ſhould have more knowledge of the Finances than all others, goes to ſupercede the neceſſity of legiſlation. The clauſe in the bill appears to me too ſtrong. I am willing that the Houſe ſhould draw information from this officer; but that he ſhould have a right to obtrude his ſentiments here at pleaſure, is a meaſure productive of a dangerous influence, and will be introducing an officer into the government, unknown to the Conſtitution.

Mr. GERRY obſerved, that if the doctrine which he had heard was eſtabliſhed, [refering to the Secretary] it ought to be extended to all the other officers, and that they ought to be diſtinguiſhed by a ribbon, or ſome other badge, which none of the members of the Houſe ſhould have a right to wear. He ſaid that the power contended for by ſome gentlemen, neceſſarily included the idea of originating money bills: What is this officer to do? Why, he is to digeſt and report plans for the improvement of the Revenue: Now if this does not comprize the power of originating money bills, I do not know what does: This will be inveſting the Preſident with a moſt alarming power. Gentlemen have dwelt much on reſponſibility; but what is the reſponſibility of this officer? Does it mean that he ſhould be reſponſible for a deficiency in the Revenue? Could he be reſponſible for the effects of a meaſure which he had only propoſed? Is he to be impeached for an error in judgment? This would be unprecedented: For what then ſhould we give him ſuch an enormous power? By ſome doctrines which have been advanced, it ſhould ſeem as if a gentleman would loſe his reputation by oppoſing this omnipotent officer; for theſe ſame arguments being uſed, which are now brought forward, when a plan of Revenue ſhall be brought in by the Secretary, the members will be told, that they are not competent to judge of finances; that they came together with local views, and without any general knowledge; that the ſyſtem propoſed by the Secretary is the reſult of great ſtudy and obſervation, and it is not proper to oppoſe it. This will preclude examination, and give an undue influence, and from being told that it is his duty officially to bring in bills, they will be told it is his duty officially to paſs them: The doctrine comes to this point, That it is impoſſible there ſhould be any reſponſibility in a collective body, and is to be found only in an individual: Authoriſe this officer to originate money bills, and what becomes of that moſt eſſential clauſe of the Conſtitution which veſts the ſole right in this Houſe? This would be an alarming circumſtance, and would raiſe a clamor among the people.

Mr. Gerry added a few more obſervations, and concluded by ſaying, he hoped the power would not be veſted in any man whatever, to palm his plans upon the repreſentative body.

Mr. LAURANCE: When this ſubject was under conſideration before, there was no difficulty Sir, about giving the power; all the difficulty then roſe from the impoſſibility of finding a competent character to exerciſe the power: It was then contended with great zeal, that boards ought to have the preference: Since then, it ſeems that a wonderful diſcovery has been made, and every member of the Houſe is found to poſſeſs this knowledge; and we are all competent to forming ſyſtems of finance and revenue. I rejoice at this diſcovery! but if gentlemen are competent to *form* ſyſtems of revenue, they certainly will be capable of judging of them; they will be able to detect the fallacy of a ſentiment, and will poſſeſs ſufficient ſagacity to diſcover the impolicy of meaſures that may be propoſed: From whence then is the dangerous influence of this officer to ariſe, when all are competent to detecting his machinations? Gentlemen appear to confound terms. To propoſe, is not to decide: He is not to decide for us: This information is to be under the controul of the legiſlature: Will giving a power to recommend, be giving a power to determine? They are certainly diſtinct, and have no connection, and yet, gentlemen talk of delegating a power to originate money bills. I can conceive of no danger: When we have made it the buſineſs of a man to acquire this knowledge, it will be valuable. Is it probable that we can ever derive the neceſſary information from the members, who are not ſtationary, who are continually coming and going? It has been a misfortune to the United States, that an individual has not been entruſted with this power: Many of the States, ſeperately, have ſuffered from the ſame cauſe; and it is owing to this, that the finances of the country are now in ſuch a ſtate of derangement. Take away this power, and all the reſt is mechanical; genius, abilities and judgment, are entirely out of the queſtion.

Every member of this Houſe, has a right to propoſe a bill; but it cannot be ſaid with propriety, that a bill is *originated*, till it has been matured and made a ſubject of diſcuſſion, by the aſſent of the Houſe.

Mr. GERRY obſerved, that if there was a perſon in the United States, competent to this duty, he had not heard of him: the Houſe (ſaid he) has however determined that they will have ſuch an officer: Sir, I would aſk whether the information of this Houſe would not be ſuperior to that of any individual whatever? If ſuch powers are mentioned now, as are propoſed to be given this officer, what may we not expect after he is eſtabliſhed? I would aſk, is a power to digeſt plans, meerly giving information? this is a wonderful diſcovery indeed! No Sir, an influence will follow, and if we give any perſon a power to influence the determinations of this Houſe, do we not ſo far depart from the conſtitution? He then adverted to what Mr. Laurance ſaid reſpecting the originating bills, which if he underſtood the gentleman, (he ſaid) was ſaying that a bill could be originated, and not originated, at the ſame moment.

Mr. VINING obſerved, that this officer would be an auxiliary to the executive, when he reports his plans: they will be before the Houſe for their rejection or approbation: he could ſee no difficulty in the buſineſs whatever.

Mr. JACKSON was in favor of the motion, for ſtriking out the words: He ſaid, the other parts of the bill are ſufficient: This officer cannot be a check upon the Preſident, as the Preſident has the power of removal. I am willing this officer ſhould have the power to digeſt plans, but never to report them, unleſs called for.

Mr. FITZSIMONS moved, that the word report, ſhould be ſtruck out, and the word *prepare* inſerted.

Mr. MADISON ſaid, he could not conceive where the danger lay that ſome gentlemen apprehended: The words objected to, are ſimilar to thoſe uſed in an ordinance paſſed by Congreſs, in 1782, in a ſubſequent ordinance to eſtabliſh a treaſury board; the ſame perſons are annexed to that board, as belonging to the office of finance, ſo that this power now exiſts in the treaſury board, ſo far as that has an exiſtence. There is a poſſibility that the power may carry ſome influence, but let us compare this with the danger that will accrue from the want of this power. In my opinion, there is more danger of a bad adminiſtration, from the want of this power, than can reſult from all the influence which the Secretary can create; more has reſulted from the want of this officer, than from all other cauſes. The gentleman (Mr. Gerry) aſks what is meant by reſponſibility? I anſwer, we ſhall eſtabliſh a reſponſibility? There will be a reſponſibily in point of reputation: a reſponſibility to the public opinion. Men of talents and diſtinction, pay a great regard to public opinion and the diſcharge of public duties, for which their reputation is pledged: they will take care to perform well: This officer upon this principle, will take a great intereſt in all laws that may paſs reſpecting the revenue, and the duties of his department.

The communications from the Preſident will always be accompanied with aluſions to revenue, if the doctrine is true that to make *propoſitions* is to originate: the Preſident may be ſaid to originate money bills: If the principle of the gentlemen is admitted, the Houſe will be abridged of the right.

Mr. PAGE ſaid, as to the argument derived from the proceedings of the late Congreſs—it is well known, they had no power, and the States accordingly rejected their doings. The Preſident, he obſerved, is a repreſentative, and therefore may claim the right of making propoſitions: With reſpect to the clauſe, a plan to be well digeſted, muſt be well ſupported: This will bring this officer into the Houſe, and thus an influence will be created, which will finally deſtroy both Houſe and Senate too.

Mr. TUCKER ſuppoſed, that the amendment of Mr. Fitzſimons, would amount to the ſame thing as the other; as to *prepare* would be nugatory, without *report* was made in conſequence: He was therefore againſt it. I would aſk, Sir, (ſaid he) why this principle, ſhould not be inſerted in the other two bills for eſtabliſhing executive departments? Why ſhould not the Secretary for foreign affairs be called upon by the branches to which he is particularly attached, to digeſt plans for carrying the buſineſs of the department into execution? It would be affrontive to them, and ſo of the war department: Why then is this Houſe to be conſidered as not qualified to do their duty? but muſt have plans digeſted and reported for us! If we are not competent to our duty, why do we ſit here? If this principle is to be adopted, we ſhall diveſt ourſelves of all power and authority whatever: We ſhall eventually place ourſelves under a maſter: We ſhall become more and more careleſs and inattentive to the buſineſs of revenue: We ſhall more and more confide in the judgment of the officer, ſuppoſing his ſyſtems are uniform, till we become intirely ignorant of the ſtate of our finances.

Mr. SHERMAN: It appears to me, that this clauſe is one of the moſt important in the bill: What is the duty here enjoined? It is to deviſe methods for the beſt arrangement of the revenue: This requires great thought, reflection, and calculation.—Let us refer to France: They had a financier who was diſplaced; but their affairs got plunged into ſuch difficulties, that they have been obliged to recal and reſtore him. This department is pointed out in the conſtitution, and the Preſident may require the advice of the officer. And though it lays with the legiſlature to form laws for the raiſing of the revenue; yet they will want the information, that the ſecretary may lay it before them, and it will lay with the Houſe whether to adopt it or not. There will be no other obligation than what ariſes from the reaſon and nature of things: The more light and information there is, the better will the legiſlature be enabled to do their duty: What is every body's buſineſs, is nobody's buſineſs. The gentleman (Mr. Gerry), ſays there is no perſon qualified: I agree with him: And there never will be, except this office is eſtabliſhed. We have men, whom experience will make equal to any in the world.

Mr. MADISON ſaid, I am of opinion that the duty ſhould be particularly enjoined: I do not fear his influence: I am more afraid of our own ignorance, of our inſtability and miſ-information. The advantage of a ſingle man of abilities, will be ſuperior to that of having an hundred ſuch men to perform the ſame duty. Upon the principle of ſome gentlemen, we muſt ſhut our doors, and not accept even the reports of committees; it lays with the Houſe to receive or reject theſe plans: If the officer ſhould be diſpoſed to obtrude ſuch as are unimportant upon the Houſe, the Speaker may be directed to keep them out of ſight, or other methods may be deviſed.]

SATURDAY, June 27.

The engroſſed bill to eſtabliſh an executive department, to be denominated the Department of War, was read a third time, and paſſed the Houſe.

Mr. BOUDINOT of the committee appointed to confer with a committee of the Senate, on the ſubject of amendments to the Impoſt and Tonnage Bills, which amendments had been diſagreed to by the Houſe, reported, That the committees had held a conferrence, and had agreed to recommend an accommodation on ſome of the points in diſpute.

Reſpecting the Impoſt Bill, the following amendments were then taken into conſideration and agreed to.

To reduce the duty on Rum, of Jamaica proof, from 15 to 10 cents, pr. gallon.

The diſcriminating clauſe, laying a leſs duty on Rum imported from States or Kingdoms in treaty with the United States, to be ſtruck out; and the duty on all ſpirits, below Jamaica proof, reduced from 12 to 8 cents.

To reduce the duty on Beer, Ale, Porter, or Cyder, imported in caſks, from 8 to 5 cents.

To reduce the duty on Beer, Ale, Porter, or Cyder, imported in bottles, from 25 to 20 cents.

To reduce the duty on coal from 3 to 2 cents.

Reſpecting the Tonnage Bill, the following amendments were agreed to.

That inſtead of wholly excluding foreign ſhips from the coaſting trade, they might be employed in it under certain reſtrictions.

That all ſhips built within the United States, and afterwards the property of foreigners, ſhould not pay more than 30 cents pr. ton.

The Houſe then took up the next amendment of the Senate to ſtrike out the diſcriminating clauſe. This gave riſe to ſome converſation, when, on the queſtion to ſtrike out the clauſe, the houſe divided: Ayes 25: Nays 26. *Adjourned.*

MONDAY, JUNE 29.

The committee to whom was referred the bill to regulate the collection of the revenue, reported a new bill, which was read, and referred to a committee of the whole, to be taken into conſideration to-morrow.

A meſſage was received from the Senate, informing, that they had acceded to the amendments laſt propoſed by the Houſe to the bill, laying an impoſt on goods, wares and merchandiſe, imported into the United States: The Secretary then delivered in the bill. [This bill has paſſed both Houſes.]

Mr. PARKER introduced a petition from William Finney, of Virginia, which was read and laid on the table.

Upon motion of Mr. THATCHER, it was voted that 100 copies of the collection bill be printed for the accommodation of the members.

Mr. SCOTT moved that the report of the committee upon the ſtate of the unappropriated lands, ſhould now be taken up: This motion was ſeconded, but upon being put, paſſed in the negative.

In committee of the whole—

On the bill for eſtabliſhing the Treaſury department.

Several alterations and amendments were made to the bill, but the diſcuſſion was not finiſhed this day.

Mr. BURKE gave notice, that he ſhould propoſe an additional clauſe, to prohibit any of the officers in this department, from being either directly, or indirectly concerned in trade, or commerce. *Adjourned.*

TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1789.

In committee of the whole, on the bill for eſtabliſhing the Treaſury department: ſeveral amendments were propoſed to this bill, and adopted; among others,

That the Treaſurer ſhould on the day of every ſeſſion of Congreſs, lay before the Houſe, copies of all accounts ſettled with the Comptroller, alſo the ſtate of the Treaſury.

*Bonds*, to be given by the ſeveral officers, are to be depoſited in the Comptroller's office, and regiſtered in the office of the ſupreme court of the United States.

The diſcuſſion of this bill being finiſhed by the committee,

Mr. BURKE introduced his additional clauſe, which provides that none of the officers in this department, ſhall be concerned, either directly, or indirectly, in trade or commerce, under loſs of their places, and other heavy penalties: This amendment occaſioned ſome converſation, when Mr. BURKE withdrew it for the preſent. The committee then roſe, and the Chairman made his report. The Speaker having reſumed the Chair, the Houſe took up the bill as amended, and accepted the ſame, with ſome further alterations.

Mr. SCHUREMAN aſked leave of abſence till the beginning of next week, which was granted. The Houſe then adjourned till to-morrow.

STOCKHOLM, March 12.

Major Morian, who had been ſent in the capacity of a courier into Finland, returned here the 7th inſt. We are aſſured he has brought advices, that the army in that province has conſented to the act of union and ſurety reſolved on by the orders of the clergy, citizens and peaſants, and part of the nobility.

HAMBURGH, April 7,

Letters from Stockholm of the 27 of March inform us, that the equeſtrian order ſtill refuſes to conſent to the act of union and guarantee, but has joined the other three orders in preſenting an addreſs of thanks to the King, which was ſent to his Majeſty by a deputation from the four eſtates.

PARIS, April 16.

A deputation, it is ſaid, is arrived from the French American colonies, to demand a diſcuſſal of their rights, by the Etats Generaux. This deputation conſiſts of thirty two-members, who will be reduced to a more convenient number.

LONDON, APRIL 22.

The merchants of this city have received upwards of 50,000l. from their correſpondents in New-York the week paſt.

A loan of eight millions of livres has been opened at Genoa, for the ſervice of the King of Sweden at an intereſt of four and a half per cent. to be repaid in eight years, begining from the year 1800.

By private letters from Smyrna we learn, that, inſtigated by the Porte, the Tartars of the Crimea have riſen up in rebellion againſt their Ruſſian maſters. They have cut in pieces ſeveral detachments of her Imperial Majeſty's forces. The number and audacity of the rebels increaſe daily, and there is every reaſon to believe, that the Ruſſians will be forced to abandon the Crimea.

At a meeting of the States General of France, no perſon can be repreſented by proxy.

Every Nobleman of 25 years of age, and an inhabitant of Paris, has a right to vote for an elector to that city.

The Univerſity of Paris ſends four Members to the States.

The election began on Monday laſt, and to prevent any outrages or tumults, the guards about the town are treble in number.

A gentleman who arrived on Monday from the Continent ſays, that when he left the Hague laſt Tueſday, they were in hourly expectation of hearing that the Emperor was dead. As that is a place of the firſt political information, it may be ſuppoſed that the Emperor is really in a very critical ſituation.

So extenſive are the revenues of ſome Poliſh noblemen, that Count Potocki, Grand Maſter of the Artillery, and Commander in Chief in the Ukraine, will alone pay to Government, as his ſhare of the 10 per cent. on his lands, the annual ſubſidy of 30,000 florins.

There never was known in the hiſtory of France ſuch tumults as have ariſen within the laſt few weeks, throughout almoſt all the Provinces. We may ſuppoſe, that from the frenzy which has ſeized the people, that the ſcarcity of grain muſt have been nearly equal to a famine, or that there has been groſs neglect in the inferior offices of government.

All hopes of peace between their Imperial Majeſties and the Porte, are entirely diſſipated; on the contrary, every thing announces a bloody campaign, from the preparations that are making by each of the contending powers.

The Turk is aſſembling his forces; and the city of Conſtantinople, as well as all its environs, ſwarm with troops, which are continually joining the armies of the Grand Vizier, and of the Pacha de Romelle; nevertheleſs, our letters ſay, that among that immenſe multitude, there are very few cavalry. The Emperor of Germany, on the other hand, is very diligent. His army aſſembled in the Banuat, to oppoſe that of the Grand Vizier, will conſiſt of 48 battalions, and of the ſame number of ſquadrons, beſides Huſſars. The corps of Prince Hohenlohe, and Prince Saxe Cobourg, are already on their march, the firſt from Tranſilvania, the ſecond from Moldavia, intending to penetrate into Wallachia, in order to act in concert with the Ruſſians.

ERRATUM.

☞ *The following error, which eſcaped notice in a number of our papers of this date, our readers will pleaſe to correct, viz. in laſt col. laſt page, 66 lines from the top, "£.90"—inſtead of which, read £.90,000.*

An O D E

For INDEPENDENCE, JULY 4*th*. 1789.

*By DANIEL GEORGE.*

'TIS done!—the edict paſt, by Heav'n decreed,
And *Hancock's* name confirms the glorious deed.
On this auſpicious morn
Was *INDEPENDENCE* born:
Propitious day!
Hail! the United States! of bleſt America!

CHORUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame,*
*The news proclaim:*
*From ſhore to ſhore,*
*Let cannons roar;*
*And joyful voices ſhout* COLUMBIA'*s name.*

See haughty Britain, ſending hoſts of foes,
With vengeance arm'd, our freedom to oppoſe;
But *WASHINGTON the Great,*
Diſpell'd impending fate,
And ſpurn'd each plan:
Americans, combine to hail the god-like man!

CHORUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame, &c.*

Let *Saratoga's* crimſon plains declare
The deeds of GATES, that "thunderbolt of war:"
His trophies grac'd the field:
He made whole armies yield—
A vet'ran band:
In vain did *Burgoyne* ſtrive his valor to withſtand.

CHORUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame, &c.*

Now *York-Town's* heights attract our wond'ring eyes,
Where loud artill'ry rends the lofty ſkies:
There *WASHINGTON* commands,
With *Gallia's* choſen bands,
A war-like train;
Like Homer's conquering Gods, they thunder o'er the plain.

CHORUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame, &c.*

Pale terror marches on, with ſolemn ſtride;
*Cornwallis* trembles, Britain's boaſted pride:
He, and his armed hoſts,
Surrender all their poſts
To *WASHINGTON*,
The friend of Liberty—*Columbia's* favourite ſon.

CHURUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame, &c.*

Now from *Mount-Vernon's* peaceful ſhades again
The Hero comes, with thouſands in his train:
'Tis *WASHINGTON the Great*
Muſt fill the chair of ſtate,
Columbia cries;
Each tongue the glorious name re-echoes to the ſkies.

CHORUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame, &c.*

Now ſhall the uſeful arts of Peace prevail,
And Commerce flouriſh, favor'd by each gale;
Diſcord, forever ceaſe!
Let Liberty, and Peace
And Juſtice reign;
For WASHINGTON protects the ſcientific train.

CHORUS.

*Fly, ſwift-wing'd Fame, &c.*

*Portland, (Maſſachuſetts) June*, 1789.

*NEW-YORK, JULY* 1, 1789.

Extract of a letter from Providence, (Rhode-Iſland) dated June 16, 1789.

"*To obviate the difficulties that have occurred to you, and which indeed have been an objection with the majority to the repealing the tender laws, the minority would readily fall in with making an inſtallment act, alſo to allow the paper to continue a tender for all executions, and would even be willing to enter ſo far into a compromiſe, as to put it upon the ſame footing with gold and ſilver, that is to ſay, a tender ſhould not cancel the debt, but the intereſt ſhould ceaſe from the time ſuch tender was made; but they declare they will not repeal, or make any alteration in the preſent law, till ſuch time as all the State notes are carried into the treaſury and cancelled; and they hold out to the people at large, the moment they break in upon the preſent ſyſtem, they will be ruined, and that by their continuing firm, they will bring the others to terms: From this you will judge we have little or nothing to expect from our preſent rulers, as at the riſing of each ſeſſions they hold up the idea to the minority, that ſomething ſhall be done at the next to ſatisfy them in either repealing or ſuſpending the tender, or calling a convention; but when met in their nocturnal convention, it is always determined to continue in their iniquitous meaſures.*

"*We are informed, that the members of Congreſs are in general pleaſed with our new revenue act, and look upon it as a favorable ſymtom of federaliſm; but I can aſſure you this is not the caſe, and it is done with a view to amuſe the people, and continue themſelves in office a little longer, with the hopes it will be in their power to oppreſs the federaliſts, and embarraſs the new government, which they are determined to do as much as poſſible; and unleſs Congreſs will adopt ſome deciſive meaſures, there is little or no proſpect of their calling a convention, as you may obſerve by their conduct in the laſt ſeſſions, which roſe laſt Saturday, without altering the tender or giving any encouragement for calling a convention; They are adjourned till next October, when there will be a new choice.*

"*From the above ſtatement of facts, you may judge, as we have nothing to hope from our preſent rulers, ſo we have nothing to dread from their reſentment, were we to withdraw ourſelves and claim the protection of the new government.*"

Extract of a letter from Ringwood, (in England) dated March 30, 1789.

"*This day ſe'nnight, I was inſpecting a patent mill for making blocks for ſhipping; and a flour mill adjoining to it, both belonging to the ſame proprietors. The works are large; and, what is ſingular, not a cog is fixed in any one of the wheels, which are all turned by rubbing one againſt the other, alias, by friction.*

"*We are apprehenſive, that the rage of the belligenent powers on the continent will at length draw Great Britain into a war: If ſo, it will be good policy in America to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality, and ſucceed the Dutch in milking the cow.*

"*The preſent poor proſpect as to a future harveſt, and the quantity of wheat that has been exported, has induced parliament to prepare a bill to prevent exportation for a certain period, which will probably paſs into an act, eſpecially ſhould the war be likely not only to continue but ſpread. Many Europeans, in different places, will certainly be fed this year with American wheat and flour, if you have enough and to ſpare. The average price of wheat, beſt, middling, and the moſt inferior, at the Corn Exchange, London, was, on the 21ſt ult. five ſhillings and nine-pence halfpenny ſterling, per buſhel, and has been riſing ſince.*"

One of the moſt important topics of political converſation, at the preſent hour, is the refractory oppoſition of the State of Rhode Iſland againſt joining the general government. In whatever light the ſubject is viewed, no reaſonable man can find any apology for ſuch obſtinacy and perverſeneſs. Perhaps no part of the United States is ſo illy ſituated to maintain a ſeparate independence. The hour is approaching when Congreſs will be under the neceſſity of ſome kind of interference; and though we entertain the moſt exalted ideas of the juſtice and moderation of that illuſtrious body, we ſtill believe they will not quietly ſuffer the Revenue to be defeated by the iniquitous conduct of a State, which they can ſo eaſily controul.

It is with pleaſure we inform our readers, that for ſeveral days paſt the buſineſs of Congreſs has progreſſed in ſuch a degree, that ſeveral very important bills have arrived nearly to completion. The public expectation, which has been ſo long awake, will ſoon be gratified with the arrangements that are to put our government into reſpectable operation. When the various and complicated objects are examined, which were neceſſary to be brought into view, the liberal temper of our countrymen will readily acquieſce in the delays that have happened; and it muſt afford great ſatisfaction to all patriotic men, that the public impatience hath not manifeſted itſelf, conſidering the ardor of hopes they entertained of advantages from the origination of the executive departments. We indulge the pleaſing anticipation, that the Preſident may ſoon commence his appointments, and that our affairs will be put into a ſtate of proſperity and dignity.

If men contemplated the advantage and happineſs that reſulted from induſtry, we ſhould find that the public regulations would prevent idleneſs by inſtituting modes of employment for citizens of all ages, and deſcriptions. The eſtabliſhment of ſuch manufactures as can employ children, and infirm, aged people, will produce the greateſt utility. It would ſnatch many a vicious youth from the paths of perdition, and make them uſeful and virtuous. Perhaps no circumſtance marks ſo much the defective ſtate of ſociety in this country as to behold ſuch numbers of inhabitants unemployed, merely for the want of ſuitable objects about which they can be engaged. Humanity no leſs than patriotiſm calls for legiſlative attention, as well as for the efforts of monied men, to bring about a reformation in this reſpect, and to invent and adopt methods for giving employment and bread to the idle and indigent of every poſſible denomination.

Frequent alluſions are made to the period, when the people of the United States ſhall realize the importance, dignity, and ſecurity of an independent nation: The proſpect only of this event has excited more reſpectful ideas of the union, than all the partial, temporary regulating commercial ſyſtems of the individual States put together; and if we have magnanimity as a people, to carry into prompt execution, thoſe acts and regulations, which will receive the fiat of our National Legiſlature, we ſhall evince that we merit the ſtation, to which, by the favor of Heaven, we are exalted.

To inſpire the people with confidence in the new government, it ſeems neceſſary that thoſe who are deſtined to adminiſter it, ſhould diſcover this confidence in the firſt inſtance: This can be done in no way ſo effectually, as by a firm and deciſive avowal of principles congenial to the ſpirit of the Conſtitution, and bringing thoſe principles into view by enacting laws, which ſhall have a prompt, independent, and energetic operation.

"If we may judge from their writings and their conduct, the French ſeem determined to regain a part, at leaſt, of that liberty which their forefarther's enjoyed in ſo much plenitude as to be diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of the Franks. There is a time when old faſhions, even in politics, become new again!"

The Proceſſion of the King of Great Britain on the 24th April, to St. Paul's Church, to return thanks for his recovery, was the moſt ſplendid exhibition ever beheld in London.

The moſt agreeable part of the late Proceſſion in London, was five thouſand ſix hundred children, belonging to the Charity Schools.———A noble ſpecimen of humanity and benevolence!

A Bill has paſſed the Houſe of Commons to allow the importation of grain from the United States into Canada.

*ARRIVALS. NEW-YORK.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Saturday,* | Schooner Hercules, | Comeran, Kingſton, 21 days, |
| | Sloop Two Friends, | Hopkins, Edenton, 7 days. |
| | Sloop Peggy, | Shaw, Oxford, Maryland, 5 days. |
| | Sloop Nenus, | Morgett, Norfolk, Vir. 5 days. |
| *Sunday,* | Brig Friendſhip, | Paddock, Liverpool, 70 doys. |
| | Brig Trinity, | Moore, London, 63 days. |
| *Monday,* | Ship Paragon, | Nichols, Liverdool, 70 days |
| | Schooner Sally, | Patterſon, Shelburne, 14 days. |
| *Tueſday,* | Schooner Charming Polly, | Bowen, Aux Cayes. |
| | Sloop Dolphin, | Burnett, Baltimore, 7 days. |
| | Sloop N. Y. Packet, | Baily, Philadelphia, 5 days. |
| | Sloop Mary, | ——, St. Auguſtine, 8 days. |
| | Sloop General Green, | Godfrey, Baltimore, 7 days. |
| | Sloop Sally, | Hall, Charleſton, 8 days. |
| | Sloop Virginia Packet, | Andrews, Rhode-Iſland. |
| | Sloop Two Friends, | Chapple, Alexandria. 8 days. |

## *The* RIGHT CONSTITUTION *of a* COMMONWEALTH EXAMINED.

*Continued from our laſt.*

The Romans never granted peace to their enemies until they had taken ſome of their territory from them. Part of ſuch conqueſts were ſold to defray the expence of the war: another portion was diſtributed among the poor plebeians. Some cantons were farmed out for the public: rapacious patricians, ſolely intent upon enriching themſelves, took poſſeſſion of ſome; and theſe lands, unjuſtly uſurped by the rich, Caſſius was for having diſtributed anew in favor of the plebeians.

The ariſtocratical pride, avarice, and ambition were all incenſed, and the ſenators greatly alarmed. The people diſcovered ſymptoms that they begun to think themſelves of the ſame ſpecies with their rulers: and one patrician of conſular dignity dared to encourage them in ſuch preſumptuous and aſpiring thoughts.

Some device or other muſt be invented to dupe the people, and ruin their leader: Virginus the conſul ſoon hit upon an expedient. Rabuleius the tribune aſked him in aſſembly, what he thought of this law? He anſwered, he would willingly conſent that the lands ſhould be diſtributed among the Roman people, provided the Latines had no ſhare; divide et impera. This diſtinction without the leaſt appearance of equity, was addreſſed ſimply to the popular hatred between the Romans and Latines, and the bait was greedily ſwallowed. The people were highly pleaſed with the conſul, and began to deſpiſe Caſſius, and to ſuſpect him of ambition to be king. He continued his friendly intentions towards the people, and propoſed in ſenate to reimburſe, as it was but juſt, out of the public treaſury, the money which the poorer citizens had paid for the corn of which Gelo, king of Syracuſe, had made the commonwealth a preſent during the ſcarcity. But even this was now repreſented by the ſenate, and ſuſpected by the people, to be only ſoliciting popular favour; and although the people felt every hour the neceſſity of a king to protect them againſt the tyranny of the ſenate, yet they had been gulled by patrician artifice into an oath againſt kings, and although they felt the want of ſuch a magiſtrate, they had not ſenſe enough to ſee it. The Agrarian laws was oppoſed in ſenate by Appius and Sempronius, and evaded by the appointment of ten commiſſioners to ſurvey the lands.

The next year Caſſius was cited before the people, and accuſed by the quæſtors of having taken ſecret meaſures for opening a way to the ſovereignty; of having provided arms, and received money from the Latines and Hernici; and of having made a very great party among the moſt robuſt of their youth, who were continually ſeen in his train.

The people heard the quæſtors, but gave no attention to Caſſius's anſwer and defence. No conſideration for his children, his relations, and friends, who appeared in great numbers to ſupport him; no remembrance of his great actions, by which he had raiſed himſelf to the firſt dignities; nor three conſulſhips and two triumphs, which had rendered him very illuſtrious, could delay his condemnation; ſo unpardonable a crime with the Romans was the ſlighteſt ſuſpicion of aſpiring at regal pawer! ſo ignorant, ſo unjuſt, ſo ungrateful, and ſo ſtupid were that very body of plebeians, who were continually ſuffering the cruel tyranny of patricians, and continually ſoliciting protectors againſt it! Without regarding any moderation or proportion, the blind tools of the hatred and vengence of their enemies, they condemned Caſſius to die, and the quæſtors inſtantly carried him to the Tarpeian rock, which fronted the forum, and threw him down, in the preſence of the whole people. His houſe was demoliſhed, and his eſtate ſold, to purchaſe a ſtatue to Ceres; and the faction of the great grew more powerful and haughty, and roſe in their contempt for the plebeians, who loſt courage in proportion, and ſoon reproached themſelves with injuſtice, as well as imprudence in the condemnation of the zealous defender of their intereſts. They found themſelves cheated in all things. The conſuls neither executed the ſenate's decree for diſtributing the lands, nor were the ten commiſſioners elected. They complained, with great truth, that the ſenate did not act with ſincerity; and accuſed the tribunes of the laſt year of betraying their intereſts. The tribunes of this year warmly demanded the execution of the decree: to elude which a new war was invented. The patricians preſerved their ariſtocratical tyranny for many centuries, by keeping up continually ſome quarrel with foreigners, and by frequently creating dictators. The patricians, in the aſſemblies by centuries, had an immenſe advantage over the plebeians. The conſuls were here choſen by the patricians, as Caſſius and Manlius were murdered by aſſemblies in centuries. In 270 Cæſo Fabius, one of Caſſius's accuſers was choſen conſul, though very unpopular. In 271 the other of Caſſius's accuſers was choſen conſul.

In theſe conteſts the ſteadineſs of the patricians is as remarkable as the inconſtancy of the plebeians; the ſagacity of the former as obvious as the ſtupidity of the latter; and the cruelty of the former as conſpicuous as the ingratitude of the latter. Prejudice, paſſion, and ſuperſtition, appear to have altogether governed the plebeians, without the leaſt appearance of their being rational creatures, or moral agents; ſuch was their total ignorance of arts and letters, all the little advantages of education which then exiſted being monopolized by the patricians. The ariſtocracy appears in preciſely the ſame character, in all theſe anecdotes, as we before ſaw it in Venice, Poland, Bern and elſewere. The ſame indiſpenſable neceſſity appears in all of them, in order to preſerve even the appearance of equity and liberty, to give the patricians a maſter in the firſt executive magiſtrate, and another maſter in a houſe of commons:—I ſay, maſter; for each of the three branches muſt be, in its turn, both maſter and ſervant, governing and being governed by turns.

To underſtand how the people were duped upon theſe occaſions, and particularly how Manlius was condemned to death, we muſt recollect that the tribunes cited him before the people, not in their curiæ, but centuries. The centuries were formed on an artful idea, to make power accompany wealth. The people were divided into claſſes, according to the proportion of their fortunes: each claſs was divided into centuries; but the number of centuries in the different claſſes was ſo unequal, that thoſe of the firſt, or richeſt claſs, made a majority of the whole, and when the centuries of this claſs were unanimous they decided the queſtion. By this inſtitution the rich were maſters of the legiſlature.

*State of the Claſſes and Centuries.*

| Claſs. | Roman Valuation. | Sterling. £. s. | No of Centuries. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 — | 100,000 — | 322 18 — | 98 |
| 2 — | 75,000 — | 242 3 — | 21 |
| 3 — | 50,000 — | 161 9 — | 21 |
| 4 — | 25,000 — | 80 14 — | 21 |
| 5 — | 11,000 — | 35 10 — | 31 |
| 6 — | — — | — — | 1 |
| | | Total | 193 |
| | | | 98 from ſub. |
| | | | 95 |
| | | Majority of the firſt claſs | 3 |

So that by citing Manlius before the people by centuries, the ſenate were ſure of a vote for his deſtruction, and the people had not ſenſe to ſee it, or ſpirit to alter it.

Nedham thus far appears to reaſon fairly and concluſively, when he adduces the examples of Melius and Manlius, and he might have added Caſſius, to prove that the people are ever in danger of loſing their liberty, and indeed he might have advanced that they never have any liberty, while they are governed by one ſenate. But theſe examples do not prove what he alludes them to prove, viz. that the people, in their ſupreme aſſemblies, ſucceſſively choſen, are the beſt keepers of their liberty; becauſe ſuch an aſſembly is ſubject to every danger of a ſtanding hereditary ſenate; and more, the firſt vote divides it into two parties, and the majority is omnipotent, and the minority defenceleſs. He ſhould have adduced theſe examples to prove the neceſſity of ſeparating the executive, legiſlative, and judicial, and of dividing the legiſlature into three branches, making the executive one of them, and independent of the other two. This is the only ſcientific government; the only plan which takes into conſideration all the principles in nature, and provides for all caſes that occur. He is equally right, and equally wrong, in the application of his other examples. "The people," ſays he, "were ſometimes in danger of a ſurpriſe by a "grandee cabinet or junto, as that upſtart ty"ranny of the decemviri, where ten men made "a ſhift to enſlave the Senate as well as the peo"ple." It is no wonder that Caſſius, Melius, and Manlius, were ſacrificed to the paſſions of the ſenate, for until the year of Rome 300, the Romans had no certain laws; ſo that the conſuls and ſenators, acting as judges, were abſolute abiters of the fate of the citizens. Terentillus, a tribune, had propoſed an ordinance that laws ſhould be inſtituted, as rules of right, both in public and private affairs. The ſenate had eluded and poſtponed, by various artifices, the law of Terentillus until this year, 300, when the tribunes ſolicited the execution of it with great ſpirit; and the ſenate, weary of contention, or apprehenſive of greater danger, at lenghth decreed, "That ambaſſadors ſhould be ſent to Athens, and to the Greek cities in Italy, to collect ſuch laws as they ſhould find moſt conformable to the conſtitution of the Roman commonwealth; and that at their return the conſuls ſhould deliberate with the ſenate upon the choice of legiſlators, of the power to be confided to them, and the time they were to continue in office." Sp. Poſthumius, Servius Sulpicius, and A. Manlius, three perſons of conſular dignity, were appointed deputies. Three gallies were prepared by the public, of a magnificence that might do honor to the Roman people.

To be continued.

## *SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA.*

THE common obſervation, that many hands make light work, but illy applies to the affairs of government; and the advantages to be derived from ſimplifying the great concerns of a nation, by placing them in ſeparate departments, and at the head of each, *one man*, competent to the duties of his ſtation, not only obtrude themſelves on the mind by a general reflection on the ſubject, but are ſupported by the example and practice of all other nations.—I will quote two inſtances from the two firſt in Europe—France and England. A well informed writer upon the commercial intereſt of England, ſays, "that frequent complaints were for a long while made as to the bulk and form of the Britiſh cuſtoms, while their apparent confuſed ſtate ſeemed to baſle all attempts for reform, and that it was to the liberality, not leſs than the perſeverance of the Houſe of Peers, that the public were at laſt indebted, in 1696, for the eſtabliſhment of the Inſpector General of the imports and exports, and for the cuſtom-houſe Ledger, which contains the particulars and value of both; and therefore formed the moſt uſeful record in regard to trade, that any country poſſeſſes." And the great financier of France, Mr. Neckar, obſerves on the perplexed ſtate in which he found the fiſcal legiſlation of that country, as follow: "This ſtrange arrangement of our cuſtoms,' ſays he, "has abſolutely ſupported itſelf by its own defects, the multiplicity of particular caſes, the accumulation of rules, the confuſion of principles, in ſhort all that antique contexture wove into ſo many knots has continually preſented the idea of an immenſe enterprize where attempts have been made to proceed to a reform by ſtudying details:—But when I took a contrary method, and by making myſelf maſter of the whole collectively by reflection; and by taking pains to diſcern the principal deciſions, and the elements as well as the intereſts of each, the whole affair became ſimplyfied." But I query whether a ſubject like this committed to ſeveral hands, poſſeſſing various opinions and drawing in different directions, would not have thereby become ſtill more entangled and confuſed?—America has it in her power to correct many errors, which for want of example before them, other nations have been led into. It is for her, by making proper arrangements in the early part of the adminiſtration of the national government, to avoid much future confuſion.—Let her ſeek "*multa in parvo*," rather than "*parvum in multis*."

Among thoſe arrangements which claim attention may be well placed the Poſt-Office, which may be made an important vehicle of information through this extenſive country; and produce a valuable income to the public—however it may now anſwer the former purpoſe, I think but little benefit ariſes in the latter view. In England ſo early as 1711 to 1714 the average nett produce of the Poſt-Office, was about £.90, and though I will not pretend to calculate the probable amount which ours may be made to nett—there remans no doubt, that the circulation reſulting from the extention of trade, the progreſs of agriculture and manufactures, and the general concerns of the nation, will give an opportunity of deriving a conſiderable revenue from this ſource: Towards which, the poſtage may be raiſed, and all letters not official or on ſpecial public ſervice made ſubject to charge: And as every meaſure which will tend to relieve the internal trade of theſe States from embarraſment, to aſſimilate the ideas, manners and cuſtoms of the inhabitants, and render more eaſy their general intercourſe with each other, will be for national advantage—the affixing of one equal value to our currency, and a general ſtandard for weights and meaſures through the union, is a ſubject which government muſt eſteem of importance in producing this valuable conſequence.

AMERICANUS.

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LETTERS,
UPON *INTERESTING SUBJECTS*,
RESPECTING THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICA.
*Written in Holland in the Year M,DCC,LXXX.*
BY HIS EXCELLENCY *JOHN ADAMS*,
WHILE HE WAS SOLE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FOR NEGOCIATING A PEACE, AND A TREATY OF COMMERCE, WITH GREAT-BRITAIN.

*Never before publiſhed.*

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